We consider concave continuous-kernel games characterized by monotonicity properties and propose discounted mirror descent-type dynamics. We introduce two classes of dynamics whereby the associated mirror map is constructed based on a strongly convex or a Legendre regularizer. Depending on the properties of the regularizer, we show that these new dynamics can converge asymptotically in concave games with monotone (negative) pseudo-gradient. Furthermore, we show that when the regularizer enjoys strong convexity, the resulting dynamics can converge even in games with hypo-monotone (negative) pseudogradient, which corresponds to a shortage of monotonicity.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the earliest works on solving continuous-kernel concave games is the work of Rosen [29] . The continuous-time gradient type dynamics was shown to converge to the Nash equilibrium in games that satisfy a so-called diagonally strictly concave condition, roughly equivalent to the pseudo-gradient being a strictly monotone operator. Recently, research on solving monotone games has seen a surge. Both continuous-time dynamics and discrete-time algorithms have been developed, mostly for games with strictly (strongly) monotone pseudogradient. For (non-strictly) monotone only games, no continuoustime dynamics exist. Discrete-time algorithms have been proposed, based on either proximal regularization, [28] , inexact proximal bestresponse, [17] or Tikhonov type regularization, [19] , and recently extended to generalized Nash equilibrium, e.g. [20] , [21] . All these works are done in a discrete-time setting and the dynamics evolve in the primal space of decision variables (and possibly multipliers). With the exception of [19] , these algorithms are applicable only in games with "cheap" (inexpensive) proximal/resolvent evaluation, [28] .
In this note we propose a family of continuous-time discounted mirror descent dynamics, whereby the dynamics evolves in the space of dual (pseudo-gradient) variables. The mapping from the dual back to the primal space of decision variables is done via a mirror map, constructed based on two general classes of regularizers. Depending on the properties of the regularizer, we show that these dynamics can converge asymptotically in merely monotone, and even hypomonotone, concave games. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first such dynamics in the literature. Our novel contributions consist in relating the convergence of the dynamics to the properties of the convex conjugate of the regularizer.
Literature review: Mirror descent algorithms have found numerous applications in recent years, e.g. in distributed optimization [2] , online learning [4] , and variational inequality problems [5] . They fall into the class of so-called primal-dual algorithms; the name mirror descent refers to the two iterative steps: a mapping of the primal variable into a dual space (in the sense of convex conjugate), followed by a mapping of the dual variable, or some post-processing of it, back into the primal space via a mirror map. The mirror descent algorithm (MDA) introduced by Nemrovskii and Yudin [1] , was originally proposed as a generalization of projected gradient descent (PGD) for constrained optimization. The authors of [31] have shown that MDA B. Gao possesses better rate of convergence as compared to the PGD, which makes it especially suitable for large-scale optimization problems. Other types of algorithms can be seen as equivalent to or special cases of MDA, e.g. dual averaging [3] and follow-the-leader [4] . A continuous-time version of MDA, referred to as the mirror descent (MD) dynamics, [12] , [15] , captures many existing continuous-time dynamics as special cases, such as the gradient flow [12] , [15] , saddlepoint dynamics [9] and pseudo-gradient dynamics [10] .
In the context of multi-agent games, mirror descent-like algorithms have been applied to continuous-kernel games [13] , finite-games [6] , [7] , and population games. The primal space is taken to be the space of decisions/strategies, and the dual space is the space of payoff vectors (in finite games) or pseudo-gradient vectors (in continuous-kernel games). Zhou et al. [13] introduced the concept of variationally stable concave game and showed that, under variational stability, the iterates of an online MDA converge to the set of Nash equilibria, whenever the step-size is slowly vanishing stepsize sequence and that the mirror map satisfies a Fenchel coupling conforming condition [13] . Since all concave games with strictly monotone pseudo-gradient are variationally stable concave games, therefore the algorithm converges in all strictly monotone games. However, there are games with a (unique) Nash equilibrium that is not necessarily variationally stable, e.g. zero-sum (monotone) games. While finding the Nash equilibrium of strictly monotone games is an important problem, convergence in such games does not necessarily imply convergence in monotone (but not strictly monotone) games.
Contributions: Motivated by the above, in this work we propose two classes of continuos-time discounted MD dynamics for concave, continuous-kernel games. The discounting is performed on the dual step of the mirror descent, which generates a weighted-aggregation effect similar to the dynamics studied for finite-action games in [7] . Discounting is known to foster convergence and eliminate cycling in games, as shown in monotone games or zero-sum games [7] , [24] . By exploiting properties of the mirror map in the two classes as well as the discounting effect, we show that these dynamics converge asymptotically to the perturbed equilibria of concave games with monotone (not necessarily strictly monotone) pseudo-gradient. Under certain conditions, they can even converge in concave games with hypo-monotone pseudo-gradient. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first such results. Our convergence analysis uses a Lyapunov function given by a Bregman divergence. We note that recently [32] identified the Bregman divergence as a natural Lyapunov candidate for a variety of systems, elegantly tying with existing results on mirror descent dynamics [12] . While the dynamics are in the dual space as in [7] , herein we consider continuous-kernel games rather than finite-action games. Furthermore, compared to [7] we set up a general framework in terms of two classes of regularizers, matched to the geometry of the action set. For either strongly convex or Legendre regularizers, we provide convergence guarantees in monotone (hypo-monotone) games and present several example discounted MD dynamics. In fact, one such example recovers the dynamics in [7] if the action set is specialized to a simplex geometry and the regularizer taken as a particular entropy example. Another example dynamics can be seen as the continuous-time dual counterpart to the discrete-time Tikhonov (primal) regularization, [19] . Compared to the undiscounted MD [13] , our discounted MD dynamics can converge in (not strictly) monotone games, and even in hypo-monotone games. A short version will appear in [39] , with two example dynamics. Here we propose two general classes, present proofs (omitted from [39] ), additional example dynamics and numerical results.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide preliminary background. Section III presents the problem setup and introduces a general form of the discounted mirror descent (DMD) dynamics. In Section IV, we construct two classes of DMD and prove their convergence. In Section V, we construct several examples of DMD from each class. We present numerical results in Section VI and conclusions in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Convex Sets, Fenchel Duality and Monotone Operators
The following is from [23] , [25] , [28] . Given a convex set C ⊆ R n , the (relative) interior of the set is denoted as (rint(C)) int(C). rint(C) coincides with int(C) whenever int(C) is non-empty. The closure of C is denoted as cl(C), and the relative boundary of C is defined as rbd(C) = cl(C)\ rint(C). The indicator function over C is denoted by δ C . The normal cone of C is defined as N Ω (x) = {v ∈ R n |v (y − x) ≤ 0, ∀y ∈ C} and π C (x) = argmin y∈C y − x 2 2 is the Euclidean projection of x onto C.
Let E = R n be endowed with norm · and inner product ·, · . An extended real-valued function is a function f that maps from 
. . , N } is the set of players, Ω p ⊆ R np is the set of player p's strategies (actions). We denote the strategy (action) set of player p's opponents as Ω −p ⊆ q∈N ,q =p R nq . We denote the set of all the players strategies as Ω = p∈N Ω p ⊆ p∈N R np = R n , n = p∈N np. We refer to U p : Ω → R, x → U p (x) as player p's real-valued payoff function, where x = (x p ) p∈N ∈ Ω is the action profile of all players, and x p ∈ Ω p is the action of player p. We also denote x as x = (x p ; x −p ) where x −p ∈ Ω −p is the action profile of all players except p.
is concave and continuously differentiable in each
x p for all x −p ∈ Ω −p . Under Assumption 1, we refer to G as a concave game. Equivalently, in terms of a cost function J p = −U p , the game G is a convex game. For the rest of the paper, we use the payoff function throughout. Given x −p ∈ Ω p , each agent p ∈ N aims to find the solution of the following optimization problem, maximize
At a Nash equilibrium, no player can increase his payoff by unilateral deviation. If Ω p is bounded, under Assumption 1, existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed (cf., e.g. [27, Theorem 4.4] ). When Ω p is closed but not bounded, existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed under the additional assumption that −U p is coercive in x p , that is, lim
. A useful characterization of a Nash equilibrium of a concave game G is given in terms of the pseudo-gradient defined as U :
Equivalently x is a solution of the variational inequality VI(Ω, −U ), [28] , or, using the definition of the normal cone,
Standard assumptions on the pseudo-gradient are as follows.
We refer to G as a monotone game if it satisfies Assumption 2(i).
III. PROBLEM SETUP
We consider a set of players who are repeatedly interacting in a concave game G. Assume that the game repeats with an infinitesimal time-step between each stage, hence we model it as a continuoustime process as in [16] , [10] . Each player maps his own partialgradient u p = U p (x) ∈ R np into an auxiliary variable z p ∈ R np via a dynamical systemż p = F (z p , u p ) and selects the next action x p ∈ Ω p via a so-called mirror map C p . The entire learning process for each player can be written as a continuous-time dynamical system, ż p = F (z p , u p ),
where
. We assume that the mirror map C p : R np → Ω p is given by,
where ϑ p : R np → R np ∪{∞} is assumed to be a closed, proper and (at-least) essentially strictly convex function, where dom(ϑ p ) = Ω p is assumed be a non-empty, closed and convex set. The function ϑ p is often referred to as a regularizer in optimization, learning and game contexts. Different forms of mirror map can be derived depending on the regularizer. Finally, since the pseudo-gradient is not assumed to be bounded, ϑ p should be chosen so that the dual space is unconstrained. The most important family of algorithms that follows the model of the learning dynamics (5) is that of mirror descent (MD) dynamics, ż p = γu p ,
where γ > 0 is a rate parameter. This can be interpreted as each player performing an aggregation of its own partial-gradient, z p (t) = z p (0)+γ t 0 u p (τ )dτ , and mapping it to an action via the mirror map C p . The discrete-time analog of (7),
with t k > 0 the step-size, is the online mirror descent studied in [13] in a similar concave game setup. In finite games, this algorithm is referred to as Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) [24] .
which is in turn equivalent to the well-known primal dynamics,
or the pseudo-gradient dynamics (PSGD), known to converge to the NE when −U (x) is strictly/strongly monotone (e.g. Lemma 2, [22] ).
In this paper we propose a related variant of the MD dynamics (7) , called the discounted mirror descent dynamics DMD, given by,
, and γ > 0. Unlike the undiscounted MD (7), in (11) each player performs an exponentially discounted aggregation. The DMD dynamics of all players can be written in stacked notation as,
Our focus in this paper is to construct classes of DMD dynamics (11) for different types of the regularizer ϑ p , (6) . We investigate the convergence of these classes of dynamics in monotone (not necessarily strictly monotone) games, based on the properties of the associated mirror map C p , (6) . We then construct several examples of DMD dynamics from each class.
IV. A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR DESIGNING DISCOUNTED MIRROR DESCENT DYNAMICS
In this section, we consider two general classes of regularizers and study properties of the associated mirror maps (proofs are given in the Appendix). Based on these, we investigate the convergence of DMD (11) , under different assumptions on the game's pseudo-gradient.
A. Properties of Induced Mirror Maps
We consider convex regularizers that can be classified as either steep or non-steep according to the following definition. Definition 1. A closed, proper, convex regularizer ϑ p : R np → R∪{∞} is said to be steep (or relatively essentially smooth) if,
converging to a point in rbd(dom(ϑ p )). Remark 2. A non-empty, convex domain dom(ϑ p ) ensures the nonemptiness of its relative interior [25, Theorem 6.2, p. 45]. Proposition 1. Let ϑ p : R np → R∪{∞} be a closed, proper, convex. Then, the following hold: (i) If ϑ p is steep, then rbd(dom(ϑ p )) ⊂ dom(∂ϑ p ) and dom(∂ϑ p )= rint(dom(ϑ p )).
(ii) If ϑ p is non-steep, then rbd(dom(ϑ p )) ⊂ dom(∂ϑ p ) and dom(∂ϑ p )= dom(ϑ p ).
Assumption 3. The regularizer ϑ p : R np → R∪{∞} is closed, proper, convex, with dom(ϑ p ) non-empty, closed and convex. In addition, (i) ϑ p is ρ-strongly convex, or (ii) ϑ p is Legendre and int(dom(ϑ p )) = ∅. Note that Assumption 3(ii) relaxes strong convexity to essential strict convexity and essential smoothness (steepness). In order to take into consideration in the regularization, cf.(6), we considerψ p = ϑ p , which inherits all properties of ϑ p . We then refer to C p as the mirror map induced by ψ p . Next, we derive properties of C p for the two classes of regularizers cf. Assumption 3(i) and Assumption 3(ii). Proposition 2. Let ψ p = ϑ p , > 0, where ϑ p satisfies Assumption 3(i), and let ψ p be the convex conjugate of ψ p . Then,
is steep, and over dom(ψ p ) whenever ψ p is non-steep. Remark 3. If ψ p = ϑ p is differentiable over all dom(ψ p ), following [33, Theorem 6.2.4(b), p. 264], Proposition 2 strengthens as follows: (i) ψ p is closed, proper, strictly convex and finite-valued over R np , (ii) C p is strictly monotone on R np , (iii) C p is bijective from R np to dom(ψ p ), (iv) C p has a full inverse ∇ψ p over dom(ψ p ). For example, ϑ p (x p ) = 1 2
x p 2 2 , x p ∈ R np , (PSGD) is such a case. Proposition 3. Let ψ p = ϑ p , > 0, where ϑ p satisfies Assumption 3(ii), and let ψ p be the convex conjugate of ψ p . Then, (i) ψ p : R np → R ∪ {∞} is closed, proper, Legendre and finitevalued over R np , i.e., dom(ψ p ) = R np . (ii) ∇ψ p : int(dom(ψ p )) → int(dom(ψ p )) is a homeomorphism with inverse mapping (∇ψ p ) −1 = ∇ψ p = C p . (iii) C p is strictly monotone on int(dom(ψ p )). Proposition 3 follows from Legendre theorem [25, Thm 26.5, p.258 ].
Next, we provide a fixed-point characterization of the mirror map C p (Proposition 4), which will be used to relate equilibria of (12) to Nash equilibria of the game (Proposition 5). Proposition 4. Let ψ p = ϑ p , >0, where ϑ p satisfies Assumption 3. Then, the mirror map induced by ψ p , C p , (6), can be written as the fixed point of the Bregman projection,
where D ψ p is the Bregman divergence of ψ p , D ψ p (y p , q p ) = ψ p (y p )−ψ p (q p )−∇ψ p (q p ) (y p −q p ). We show next that any rest point x of DMD (11) or (12) is the Nash equilibrium associated with a perturbed payoff. Any equilibrium point of the closed-loop system (12) is characterized by,
i.e., z = U • C(z), x = C • U (x). From (6), by Berge's maximum theorem, C is compact valued and upper semicontinuous. Since U is jointly continuous, U • C is also compact and upper semicontinuous, and by Kakutani's fixed-point theorem, admits a fixed point.
Proposition 5. Let ψ p = ϑ p , >0, where ϑ p satisfies Assumption 3 and C p the induced mirror map. Any rest point x = C(z) of DMD (11) is the Nash equilibrium of the game G with perturbed payoff,
As → 0, x → x , where x = (x p ) N p=1 is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof. From the fixed-point characterization of the mirror map (13) (cf. Proposition 4), evaluated at z = u, one can write ∀p,
where δ Ω p (y p ) is the indicator function over Ω p . By Fermat's condition for unconstrained optimization [30, Prop 27.1, p. 497 ],
or [30] was used. By Proposition 2(ii) or Proposition 3(ii), C p (u p ) = ∇ψ p (u p ), and C p has ∇ψ p as a left-inverse (cf. Proposition 2(vi) or Proposition 3(ii)), therefore, ∇ψ p (C p (u p )) = ∇ψ p (∇ψ p (u p )) = u p . Substituting this and
In stacked form, with ∇ϑ(x) = (∇ϑ p (x p )) p∈N , this is written as
x is a Nash equilibrium for the perturbed payoff U p . As → 0, (17) yields (4), hence x → x . Remark 4. If −U is monotone, then −(U (x) − ∇ϑ(x)) is strictly monotone, hence a unique perturbed NE exists for each > 0.
B. Convergence of DMD under Induced Mirror Maps
Using key properties given by Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, for regularizers satisfying either Assumption 3(i) or Assumption 3(ii), in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 we show convergence of DMD under corresponding induced mirror maps in the two cases, respectively. Theorem 1. Let G = (N , (Ω p ) p∈N , (U p ) p∈N ) be a concave game with players' dynamics given by DMD (11) . Assume there are a finite number of isolated fixed-points z of U • C, where C = (C p ) p∈N is the mirror map induced by ψ p = ϑ p satisfying Assumption 3(i). Then, under either Assumption 2(i), (ii), or (iii), with the additional assumption that −U p is coercive in x p whenever Ω p is non-compact, for any > 0, the auxiliary variables z(t) = (z p (t)) p∈N converge to a rest point z while players' actions x(t) = (x p (t)) p∈N converge to x, a perturbed Nash equilibrium of G. Alternatively, under Assumption 2(iv), the same conclusions hold for any > µρ −1 .
Proof. Let z be a rest point of (12), z = u = U (C(z)). Take as Lyapunov function the sum of Bregman divergences of ψ p ,
Since ψ p is convex (cf. Proposition 2(i)), it follows that V is positive semidefinite. When Ω p is compact, since U p i (x p ; x −p ) is continuous, |U p i (x p ; x −p )| ≤ M, ∀x ∈ Ω, for some M > 0. Then from (11), |z p i (t)| ≤ e −γt |z p i (0)|+M(1−e −γt ), and |z p i (t)| ≤ max{z p i (0), M},∀t ≥ 0. Hence D = {z ∈ R n | z 2 ≤ √ nM } is nonempty, compact, positively invariant set. Alternatively, when Ω p is non-compact, for anyx p ∈ int(dom(ψ p )), ψ p (·)− <x p , · > is coercive [26, Prop. 1.3.9(i)], hence V is coercive and D can be any of its sublevel sets. Along any solution of (11) 
where x = C(z) and x = C(z), cf. (14) was used. Since u = U (x), u = U (x), under Assumption 2(i), 2(ii), or 2(iii) the first term ofV (z) is non-positive, therefore,
where we used the fact that C p is ρcocoercive (cf. Proposition 2(iv)). This implies thatV (z) ≤ 0,∀z ∈ R n andV (z) = 0 only if z ∈ E := {z ∈ D|C(z) = C(z)}. We find the largest invariant set M contained in E forż = γ(−z+U • C(z)). On E,ż = γ(−z +z), hence since γ > 0, z(t)−z → 0 as t → ∞, for any z(0) ∈ E. Thus, no other solution except z can stay forever in E, and M consists only of equilibria. Since by assumption there are a finite number of isolated equilibria, by LaSalle's invariance principle, [11] , it follows that for any z(0) ∈ D, z(t) converges to one of them, z. Finally, since C p is ( ρ) −1 -Lipschitz (cf. Proposition 2(iii)),
where, by Proposition 5, x is a perturbed Nash equilibrium.
Alternatively, under Assumption 2(iv), following from (19),
where we again used the ρ-cocoercivity of C p . Assuming that > µρ −1 , thenV (z) ≤ 0, and convergence follows as before.
be a concave game with players' dynamics given by DMD (11) . Assume there are a finite number of isolated fixed-points z of U • C, where C = (C p ) p∈N is the mirror map induced by ψ p = ϑ p satisfying Assumption 3(ii). Then, under either Assumption 2(i), (ii), or (iii), with the additional assumption that −U p is coercive in x p whenever Ω p is non-compact, for any > 0, the auxiliary variables z(t) = (z p (t)) p∈N converge to a rest point z while players' actions x(t) = (x p (t)) p∈N converge to x, a perturbed Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof. We use the same Lyapunov function (18) . Since under Assumption 3(ii), ψ p is Legendre (cf. Proposition 3(i)), ψ p is strictly convex on int(dom ψ p ), hence V is positive definite at z = z. Moreover, since ψ p is essentially strictly convex, by [34, Thm 3.7(iii)], D ψ p (·, z p ) is coercive, so that V is radially unbounded. Then along any solution trajectory of (11), using Proposition 3(ii), we can write as in (19) ,
, under either Assumption 2(i), 2(ii) or 2(iii), the first term ofV (z) is non-positive, so that,V (z) ≤ −γ(C(z)−C(z)) (z −z). Since C is strictly monotone by Proposition 3(iii), thereforeV (z) < 0, ∀z ∈ R n \{z}, and by Lyapunov theorem [11, Theorem 4.1, p.114], z is asymptotically stable and therefore z(t) converges to z,∀z(0) ∈ R n . By the continuity of C(z) (Proposition 3(ii)), it follows that x(t) converges x = C(z), ∀x(0) = C(z(0)), where x is a perturbed Nash equilibrium.
Remark 5. In general, convergence is to the set of perturbed Nash equilibria. By Proposition 5, as → 0, x → x , where x is a Nash equilibrium of G. Under Assumption 2(ii) or 2(iii), the game admits a unique Nash equilibrium, so x(t) converges towards the unique x . Note that in the case of Legendre regularizers, Theorem 2 gives convergence guarantees only for monotone games. On the other hand, in the case of strongly convex regularizers, Theorem 1 gives guarantees for convergence in hypo-monotone games, based on cocoercivity of the mirror map. We note that the above results can be extended to the weighted monotone case, [29] ,
λ p > 0, p ∈ N , by appropriately redefining the regularizer.
V. EXAMPLES OF DMD
We now provide several examples of DMD, whereby the mirror map is generated by regularizers in one of the two general classes. The first two are for examples of strongly convex regularizers (nonsteep and steep), and the other three are for Legendre regularizers. For all derivations, we repeatedly use of the following result, based on a simple application of [23, Theorem 4.14, p. 92 ]. Lemma 1. Let ψ p = ϑ p , >0, where ϑ p satisfies Assumption 3, and let ψ p be the convex conjugate of ψ p . Then,
where ϑ p is the convex conjugate of ϑ p .
Example 1. Euclidean Regularization over Compact Sets
Let Ω p ⊂ R np be nonempty, compact and convex and consider,
By inspection, ϑ p is supercoercive, 1-strongly convex (Assumption 3(i)) and non-steep, hence, ψ p = ϑ p inherits the same properties over Ω p = dom(ψ p ). The convex conjugate ψ p is given by,
where π Ω p is the Euclidean projection on Ω p . By Proposition 2(ii), ψ p is continuously differentiable on R np and can be shown to have a gradient ∇ψ p (z) = C p (z p ) = π Ω p ( −1 z p ). By Proposition 2(iii), (iv), (v), (vi), C p (z) is −1 -Lipschitz, -cocoercive, surjective from R np onto Ω p and has a left-inverse on Ω p given by ∇ψ p (x p ) = x p . Then the DMD corresponding to (11) , (20) is given by,
which we refer to as the projected DMD (or PDMD). By Theorem 1, PDMD (22) is guaranteed to converge to x, a perturbed Nash equilibrium in any monotone game G = (N , (Ω p ) p∈N , (U p ) p∈N ), for any > 0, and in any µ hypo-monotone game, for any > µ. Remark 6. (22) can be viewed as the continuous-time dual counterpart to the Tikhonov (primal) regularization algorithm in [19] .
Example 2. Entropy Regularization over the Unit Simplex
Let
x p i = 1} := ∆ p and
with the convention 0log 0 = 0. It can be shown that ϑ p is supercoercive, 1-strongly convex over ∆ p with respect to · 1 (Assumption 3(i))) and steep. Hence ψ p = ϑ p inherits the same properties. Then ψ p (z p ) = log( np i=1 exp( −1 z p )), and
By Proposition 2(iii), (iv), (v), (vi), C p (z p ) is −1 -Lipschitz with respect to · ∞, -cocoercive, surjective from R np onto rint(∆ p ) and has a left-inverse on rint(∆ p ) given by ∇ψ p (x p ) = (log(x p )+1).
Then the DMD corresponding to (23) is given by (11) , (24) , and by Theorem 1, is guaranteed to converge to a perturbed NE in any monotone game G = (N ,(∆ p ) p∈N ,(U p ) p∈N ), for any > 0, and in any µ hypo-monotone game, for any > µ. This dynamics corresponds to the exponentially-discounted reinforcement learning dynamics (EXP-D-RL) for finite games studied in [7] . There are several other wellknown entropies over the simplex ∆ p which are steep, e.g. the logbarrier or the Burg entropy, ϑ p (x) = − i=1 log(x p i ), [6] . Undiscounted dynamics were shown to converge in games with a strict NE, [6] , but not in zero-sum games with an interior NE. According to Theorem 1, the discounted DMD dynamics corresponding to these entropies are in fact guaranteed to converge in monotone games.
Example 3. Entropy Regularization over Non-Negative Orthant
Let Ω p = R np ≥0 and consider the Boltzmann-Shannon entropy
with the convention 0 log 0 = 0. It can be shown that ϑ p is supercoercive and Legendre [34] (Assumption 3(ii)), hence ψ p = ϑ p is too. The dual map ψ p : R np → R∪{∞} is given by,
which is strictly monotone over int(R np ≥0 ). Then the DMD corresponding to (25) is given by (11) , with C p , (26) , which we refer to as the Boltzmann-Shannon DMD (or BDMD). By Theorem 2, BDMD is guaranteed to converge to x, a perturbed Nash equilibrium in any monotone game G = (N ,(R np ≥0 ) p∈N , (U p ) p∈N ), for any > 0. The BDMD can be generalized to Ω p = [−c p , ∞] np , c p ≥ 0 and the mirror map is given by C p (z p ) = exp( −1 z p )−c p 1.
Example 4. Entropy Regularization over Unit Square
Let Ω p = [0, 1] np and consider the Fermi-dirac entropy
which can be shown to be supercoercive and Legendre [34] (Assumption 3(ii)), hence ψ p = ϑ p is supercoercive and Legendre as well. The dual map ψ p : R np → R ∪ {∞} is given by,
sometimes referred to as the softplus function. The mirror map is
It can be shown that C p is strictly monotone over int([0, 1] np ) with inverse ∇ψ p (x p ) = ( log(x p j /(1 − x p j ))) np j=1 . The associated DMD is given by (11) , (29) , which we refer to as the Fermi-Dirac regularized (FDMD). By Theorem 2, FDMD (11), (29) , is guaranteed to converge to a perturbed NE in any monotone game G = (N , ([0, 1] np ) p∈N , (U p ) p∈N ), for any > 0. The FDMD can be generalized to Ω p = [a p ,b p ] np , by appropriately modifying it.
Example 5. Regularization over Euclidean Spheres
Assume that Ω p = {x p ∈ R np | x p − c p 2 ≤ a p } := B np a p (c p ). Consider the Hellinger distance, ϑ p (x p ) = − a p2 − x p − c p 2 2 , which can be shown to be supercoercive and Legendre [34] . Hence ψ p = ϑ p is supercoercive and Legendre as well (Assumption 3(ii)). The dual map is ψ p (z p ) = (a p 1 + −1 z p 2 2 − −1 c p z) and the mirror map is given by,
strictly monotone over R np . The associated DMD given by (11), (30) , which we refer to as the Hellinger regularized DMD (HDMD),
Name and Acronym Dynamics Mirror Map Player Action Set
Projected Discounted MD (PDMD)ż p = γ(−z p + u p ) x p = π Ω p ( −1 z p ) Ω p
Exponentially-Discounted RL (EXPD-RL)
Hellinger Regularized DMD (HDMD) 
, for any > 0, cf. Theorem 2. We summarize all these discounted dynamics in Table 1 . Note that the undiscounted versions of these dynamics are given by (7) with the corresponding mirror maps.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulations results. We note that an example of resource sharing via Kelly's mechanism [36] in a strictly monotone game for N = 4 players is provided in [39] . Here consider representative examples of monotone and hypo-monotone games. For comparison purposes, all dynamics are simulated over the same duration, and unless otherwise specified, with the same and γ=1, for initial value z(0)=0. For PDMD (22) and FDMD we assume that each player's strategy is projected onto [−100,100] (or Cartesian product of it) whenever the action set is unconstrained, and onto [0,100] whenever the action set is a subset of the non-negative orthant. For HDMD, we used the ball of radius 100 centered at origin. The color code for each dynamics is as follows: PDMD (22) (blue), BDMD (red), FDMD (orange), HDMD (magenta).
Example 1. (Monotone and Hypo-monotone Quadratic Games)
In this example we compare the discounted DMDs in a monotone quadratic and a hypo-monotone quadratic game. For the monotone game, we also compare them with the discrete-one introduced in [18] , [19] . Quadratic games constitute an important class of games that serve as second-order approximation to other nonlinear payoff functions and models of competition between markets [27, p. 190] . Consider an N player game where each player p has a quadratic payoff function,
where x p ∈ R np and A p ij =A p ji ∈R np×np , with each A p ii being symmetric and b p i ∈R np , c p ∈R. Let A p ∈ R n×n be the block matrix, A p =(A p ij ), and b p =[b p 1 . . . b p N ] ∈R n , we can write U p (x p ; x −p ) = 1 2
x A p x+b p x+c p . The pseudo-gradient of this game is
where R = {−20, 0}, hence the game is monotone. The set of Nash equilibria is x ∈ {(x 1 ,x 2 ) ∈ R 2 |x 1 = 50 + x 2 }, set indicated with a green line in Figure 1 . In Figure 1 , we provide simulations of PDMD, BDMD, FDMD and HDMD, all for = 0.5, in (x 1 , x 2 ) plane. In order to distinguish between trajectories, each dynamics is simulated with a different initial z(0). We observe that each of the dynamics PDMD, FDMD and HDMD converges close to (25,−25) (a NE), while BDMD converges close to (50,0) (also a NE). , and x = (20,−20) . We note that only the PDMD is guaranteed to converge to a perturbed NE (cf. Theorem 1), for >5. In Figure 2 we provide simulations of the DMDs for =5.1, which show that PDMD converges to (x 1 , x 2 )=(16.4,−16.7) as per Theorem 1 (relatively close to x (green star)), while the other dynamics fail to converge. Remark 7. We compare the discretization of PDMD (22) to the (coordinated) iterative Tikhonov regularization (ITR) scheme [19] ,
where, t k and k are sequences of diminishing step-size. By [ 
where we use t k = 0.001 and = 0.1. We run this for the monotone game considered before and we also run ITR with t k = k −0.48 , k = k −0.51 (as in [19] ). The evolution of x p k under PDMD and ITR is shown in Figure 3 , with ITR shown in orange and PDMD shown in blue (solid line one player, dashed line the other one). Both converge close to the NE at x = (25, −25), but we find for all the step-sizes, PDMD has a faster rate of convergence as compared to ITR. In this example we compare discounted DMDs with their undiscounted versions, applied to learning the mean of a distribution, formulated as a monotone game. Let Z ∼ P(z) and X ∼ Q(x) be two random variables. We wish to construct a function G θ : R n → R n , parameterized by an unknown parameter θ ∈ R n , such that E(G θ (Z)) = E(X). The authors of [35] showed that G θ can be constructed by solving the saddle point problem 1 , min θ∈R n max
where Dw :R n →R is a function parametrized by unknown parameter w ∈ R n . As an example, let Z ∼ N (0, 1), X ∼ N (v, 1) (Gaussian distributions), v = E(X) ∈ R, Dw(X) = w X and G θ (Z) = Z + θ, for θ, w ∈R. Then the objective in (34) is given by, E X (Dw(X))− E Z (Dw(G θ (Z))) = w E X (X) − w E Z (Z + θ) = w (v − θ). With x 1 = θ, x 2 = w, (34) is equivalent to a two-player zero-sum game with
where the player sets are Ω 1 = R, Ω 2 = R. The pseudo-gradient is
, hence the game is monotone, and has NE x = (v,0). Let v = 50. In Figure 4 , we show results for the discounted dynamics (solid), as well as for their undiscounted counterparts (dashed), for = 0.1. We slightly increased the solver step-size for FDMD and HDMD in order to distinguish trajectories. As seen, all discounted DMD dynamics converge to the NE x (shown by a green star), whereas the undiscounted dynamics cycle. 
where the coefficients w = (w 0 , w 1 , . . . , w M ) ∈ R M+1 are to be found for the best M -order fit through the data D, a ∈ {a 1 , . . . , a N }.
These coefficients can be found by solving min
1 This is an example of the so-called Generative Adversarial Network (GAN), specifically, the Wasserstein GAN (without Lipschitz constraint). Assume ran(A) = R N , then the objective function can be rewritten as [37] , [38] , and min w∈R M+1 (2, 12) , (3, 15) , . . . , (18, −10) , (19, 20) ,(20, 2)} and M = 3 (fit to a third-order polynomial). The optimal coefficients are x 1 = (36.0640,−13.0372,1.2084,−0.0342). Figure 5 shows x 1 trajectories under PDMD, FDMD and HDMD, all with = 0.1, as well as PSGD, with x 1 as green stars. We see that FDMD and HDMD converge to x , while PDMD is very slow. The thirdorder polynomial associated with the final coefficients found by each dynamics, along with the best fit are shown in Figure 6 (data points as red circles), indicating superior performance of FDMD and HDMD. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed two continuous-time classes of mirror dynamics for monotone concave games. We showed that they are guaranteed to converge to a perturbed Nash equilibrium, which tends to a Nash equilibrium of the game as the regularization goes to zero.
